Abstract
I shall examine the dispute resolution mechanisms (DRMs) in some older European Union (EU) agreements before moving to look at DRMs in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and investor-state dispute resolution under the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
1 I will then look at the so-called 'new generation' of EU agreements, with particular reference to the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) before considering the Commission's proposed investment court system. 
'Old Generation' DRMs in International Agreements
Involving the EU I will start by considering the DRMs in three long-standing agreements the EU has with non-EU states.
A Ankara Agreement (1963)
The first agreement the European Economic Community entered into was the Association Agreement with Turkey, signed in 1963, also known as the Ankara Agreement. 3 The dispute resolution procedure in Article 25 provides that the contracting parties may submit a dispute to the Council of Association, an essentially political body consisting of government officials from Turkey, the member states and the EU. The Council of Association had the power to settle any such dispute by decision, which would be binding, or it could refer the dispute to any existing court or tribunal or, indeed, to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Arbitration was contemplated, based on the rules to be drawn up by the parties, if neither the Council of Association nor the existing court or tribunal could resolve the dispute. However, the fact that the Ankara Agreement provided for a dispute resolution procedure has not precluded the CJEU from holding that certain provisions of the Agreement have direct effect. 4 For example, Article 41 of the 1970 Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which provides for a standstill on any new restrictions on the freedoms of establishment and service provisions, was found to have direct effect in Soysal and Savatli and, as such, was enforceable in national courts.
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B European Economic Agreement and the EU (1992)
I now turn to the European Economic Agreement (EEA Agreement), which, presently, is an agreement between the EU-28, on the one hand, and Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway, on the other. 6 The aim of the EEA Agreement is to create a homogenous European economic area (EEA), which promotes the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the contracting parties, but whose depth of integration is less far-reaching than the EU. 7 The DRM envisioned the creation of a new overarching court system for the EEA. As is well known, the initial DRM, the EEA Court, was found unlawful by the CJEU as a 'threat … to the autonomous of the Community legal order' as it could interpret substantively identical provisions of EEA law in a divergent manner to the CJEU. 8 Nonetheless, the CJEU stressed that 'an international agreement providing for [a court with jurisdiction to settle disputes between the the contracting parties] is in principle compatible with Community law'. 9 It was in this spirit that the second, more modest, proposal for a court with jurisdiction over the EEA Agreement as it applies to the three European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states -the EFTA Court -was approved by the CJEU in Opinion 1/92. 10 With respect to private enforcement, the EEA Agreement entails no transfer of legislative sovereignty in an EFTA state, strictly speaking, 11 and, as such, lacks direct effect in EFTA states. 12 Yet the EFTA Court, in partnership with the courts of last instance in the EFTA states, has ensured its practical direct effect, 13 particularly through the principle of state liability.
14 In practice, EFTA Court preliminary rulings, which are technically referred to as advisory opinions, are generally treated as binding on all EFTA states, 15 albeit with one notable exception in Norway, 16 and individuals can readily rely on EEA rights before national courts in EFTA states. 17 the EU courts' side, the Court of First Instance held, early on in the life of the EEA Agreement, that the 'unconditional and precise' prohibition on customs duties had direct effect within the EU.
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With respect to the content of the rights in the EEA Agreement, the EFTA Court has faithfully followed the case law of the CJEU, sometimes reversing its previous case law to achieve such consistency 19 or, in EFTA jargon, 'homogeneity'. 20 Substantively identical provisions of the EEA Agreement and the EU treaties have therefore been given identical interpretations, and EU principles have been readily grafted onto the EEA legal order. 21 The net effect is that, for example, any disguised health restriction on salmon imports would be treated the same way if challenged in a court in Scotland by a Norwegian (Eirik Bjornson) or in a court in Norway by a Scot (Douglas MacDonald).
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In relation to EU states, on the one hand, and EFTA states, on the other, Article 111 of the EEA Agreement provides a complex DRM, which, effectively, has a consensual resolution part and a self-help part. First, the Joint Committee is to find an 'acceptable solution' to the dispute, and, where the dispute concerns substantively identical provisions in EEA and EU law, the CJEU is to rule on the matter if both parties agree. Should no such solution be found, or a reference to the CJEU prove impossible due to a lack of consent of the disputing parties, then a contracting party may take proportionate safeguarding measures by regarding the affected part of the EEA Agreement as provisionally suspended. Article 111 also provides for arbitration to review the proportionality of the self-help measures, 23 but it clarifies that this tribunal has no jurisdiction to interpret the EEA Agreement itself. However, the powers of the Joint Committee in this regard have never been invoked. This is because no significant discrepancy between EEA and EU law has ever arisen since the EFTA Court has ensured the homogeneous interpretation of EEA law with respect to substantively identical provisions. 
C EU and Switzerland
The relationship between the EU and Switzerland is rather like Switzerland's landscapemulti-faceted. Despite being surrounded by the EU and the EEA, Switzerland is part of neither following its rejection of EEA membership by referendum in 1992. 25 Switzerland chose to adopt a bilateral approach, and the EU-Switzerland relationship is conditioned on an intricate web of more than 100 bilateral treaties, ranging from the broad, such as the 1999 Agreement on Free Movement of Persons, to the very precise, like the 2004 Agreement on Processed Agricultural Foods. 26 Each bilateral agreement has its own DRM, and there is no consistent enforcement scheme that runs through them. The majority mostly have Joint Committees, like the Ankara Agreement. One such example is the Agreement on Free Movement of Persons, which may be used as an example of the relatively weak nature of Joint Committees as DRMs. 27 A formal statement of the Joint Committee of that Agreement in 2012 states that there were 'persistent disagreements' in relation to the freedom of movement and that a number of issues 'show the limits of the Joint Committee as mechanism for the settlement of disputes'. 28 Indeed, the protection of the freedom of movement seems to have fallen by the wayside in Switzerland. Following a referendum in February 2014, the Federal Constitution was modified to impose annual quotas on immigration and to prohibit the conclusion of any international agreement that would undermine those quotas.
29 Such a development poses clear problems in light of the principles contained in the Agreement on Free Movement of Persons.
There is one agreement -the EC-Switzerland Air Transport Agreement -which provides for the exclusive role of the CJEU to resolve any disputes as to the validity of decisions taken by the EU institutions under the agreement, as it did so in relation to conflicting German and Swiss regulations on the flight path of airplanes descending into Zurich airport. 30 In a similar vein, the Cooperation Agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community and the Swiss Confederation confers the CJEU with similar jurisdiction over, first, the legality of enforcement decisions taken by the Commission and, second, the arbitration of certain contracts under the Euratom Framework Programmes. On the EU side, the difference between the depth of integration in the EU treaties and the à la carte sectoral bilateralism in the Swiss-EU agreements naturally impacts on the extent to which existing interpretations of EU law apply to them. 32 As a result, the CJEU has refrained from giving the same interpretation to provisions of the Agreement on Free Movement of Persons and corresponding provisions of EU law, citing the more limited scope of integration in the bilateral relationship that Switzerland has with the EU. 33 A similar conclusion was reached where Swiss International Air Lines sought to challenge a Commission decision that derogated from the EU carbon tax scheme for airline operators, but excluded flights to and from Switzerland from that derogation. In response to Swiss International Air Line's argument that this violated the principle of equality, the CJEU responded that 'the institutions and agencies of the Union are relieved of any obligation to apply the principle of equal treatment to third countries' and that, accordingly, there was consequently no need 'to examine whether such a difference in treatment can be objectively justified'. 34 On the Swiss side, enforcement in the Swiss courts proceeds on a piecemeal basis. A good example is Physiogel, where the Swiss Supreme Court rejected the Cassis de Dijon line of cases, making it clear that it did not need to be 'applied automatically in Switzerland'.
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D DRMs and Direct Effect
To summarize then, certain provisions of the Ankara Agreement have been given direct effect by the CJEU, certain provisions of the EEA Agreement have been given practical direct effect by the EFTA Court in the EFTA states and direct effect in the EU member states and certain provisions of some of the Swiss agreements have been given selective effect by the Swiss courts and generally no direct effect in the CJEU. More generally, one can say that the question of whether a provision in an international agreement has direct effect has been decided by the CJEU on a case-by-case basis. 36 In more recent years, the trend has been for the EU to exclude direct effect in its international agreements, a practice that seems to have become standard as of 2008, but whose roots go further back. 37 The shift away from direct effect is, in reality, indicative of a broader movement away from individual enforcement of international agreements before national courts towards the exclusive settlement of disputes in such agreements via designated DRMs. To that extent, the EU has increasingly aligned itself with the DRM found in the WTO's DSU.
WTO
The WTO is the successor of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which itself rose from the ashes of World War II and the trade protectionism that accompanied the economic downturn that preceded it. 38 GATT, by facilitating the mutual reduction of trade barriers and other significant measures of economic cooperation, moved the world much closer to John Maynard Keynes' vision, which he recorded in 1920, in which '[t]he inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep'.
39 By 1993, however, it became clear that there was a need for a more formalized DRM to administer the trade regime rather than the former chiefly diplomatic system that, in the words of one commentator, was 'dominated by an anti-legal culture'. 40 The DRM was overhauled in 1994 in the WTO Agreement signed in Marrakesh. 41 Provision was made for a dispute to be heard first by an ad hoc panel, which could then be appealed to the Appellate Body. Both of the reports are adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which may reject the reports but only unanimously.
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As a preliminary point, I note that the DRM in the WTO concerns disputes between states only. Thus, our Douglas MacDonald could only challenge a Norwegian disguised health restriction if the UK endorsed his claim and brought it against Norway. As to the structure of the DRM, the panel is constituted of three panellists selected by the WTO Secretariat. 43 Provision is made for the parties to contest the panellists appointed by the Secretariat, in which case the director-general selects the panellists. 44 The panellists are to be selected with a view to ensuring their independence, 101, describes the approval by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) as a 'mere ritual or formality in the WTO' and refers to the system as a 'double-check procedure of dispute settlement'. 43 DSU, supra note 1, Art. 8(6). 44 Ibid., Art. 8(7). diversity of background and spectrum of experience. 45 To this effect, panellists may not share nationality with any of the parties to the dispute. 46 The Appellate Body is composed of seven persons, who sit three strong. They are appointed for a four-year term that is renewable once. They are to be 'persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally'. 47 In contra-distinction to the panel members, the members of the Appellate Body must not be affiliated with any government and must serve regardless of their nationality. The DSU allow for an appeal in respect of 'issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel', as per Article 17(6). This is a familiar ground of appeal, as it is an appeal on a point of law.
A distinct feature of the Appellate Body is that it operates according to a principle of collegiality, a practice whereby the appeal is decided and heard by only the chosen three persons, yet the written pleadings are discussed by all seven members of the Appellate Body. In the words of the erstwhile chairman of the Appellate Body, ClausDieter Ehlermann, this collegiality 'has proved to be of enormous benefit to the work of the appellate Body … [and has] permitted divisions to draw on the individual and collective expertise of all members'. 48 However, as beneficial as this thought may be, this procedure differs from a court procedure as we understand it.
With respect to the interpretation of the WTO Agreement, I note the words of Lord McNair's text on treaty interpretation, according to which 'there is no part of the law of treaties which the text-writer approaches with more trepidation than the question of interpretation'. 49 Article 3.2 of the DSU stipulates that the DRM should 'clarify the existing provisions [of the WTO Agreements] in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law'. In consequence, the corpus of WTO law chiefly applies the principles of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 50 As such, the interpretations have focused predominantly on the ordinary meaning of the text, although I recognize that this does not capture the full nuance of the corpus of WTO law. 51 This contrasts with the CJEU's approach 45 Ibid., Art. 8(2). 46 Ibid., Art. 8(3). 47 Ibid., Art. 17(3 Enforcement of the WTO reports is carried out by common accord of the disputing parties, first amicably and, if that fails, then by self-help. First, a reasonable period, which shall generally not exceed 15 months, is given to secure compliance, and the DSB is required to monitor the steps taken to ensure this compliance. Second, if the reasonable period for compliance elapses, Article 22 requires the parties to enter negotiations to settle on 'mutually acceptable compensation', which, if not reached within 20 days, then gives the right to the complaining party to suspend existing obligations and concessions to that party according to a finely tuned scheme for suspending tailored parts of the agreement. 54 In terms of remedies, the reports are declaratory. They do not order or enforce anything. Rather, they determine which party is at fault and make recommendations as to how that party can bring itself back into line with WTO obligations in the future. 55 The primary aim of the WTO, therefore, is prospective compliance rather than righting past wrongs by granting damages, ordering the reimbursement of subsidies or granting interim relief.
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This brings us to direct effect. The classic formulation for the lack of direct effect of the WTO is laid down by the WTO itself in the panel report in United States -Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, in which it is stated that '[n]either the GATT nor the WTO has so far been interpreted by GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order producing appears, at first glance, as belonging to the strict construction school that interprets texts literally and narrowly … in practice, however, much of the reasoning in interpretation is informed by the object and purpose, either consciously or subconsciously, where they can be identified, even though they may not given explicitly as such in the analysis.' T. Gazzini 57 EU law also recognizes that the WTO does not generally have direct effect, such that it is only occasionally possible to set aside a measure of EU law for want of consistency with a WTO norm. So much was established in 1972 in International Fruit, where the CJEU noted that the GATT was 'characterised by the great flexibility of its provisions' and, accordingly, not sufficiently precise and unconditional. 58 There are exceptions, however; one being where the EU legislature has shown the intention to implement in EU law a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO Agreement. 59 This was the case in Nakajima, where the EU's basic Regulation on Anti-Dumping and the relevant parts of the GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement were, in the Advocate General's words, 'almost completely identical'. 60 The lack of direct effect may not necessarily be a disadvantage. The point was recognized by Ehlermann, who stated in 2003:
I am … opposed to giving WTO law direct effect in giving private parties the right to invoke WTO law before national courts. It is obvious that recognizing the direct effect of international agreements results in a shift of power between constitutional institutions: The position of the government and the parliament is weakened, and that of the courts strengthened. … I am convinced that this would not be a desirable development [as this would] increase the current imbalance between the quasi-judicial and the political processes of the WTO. 
ICSID
I turn now to ICSID, the arbitration rules set up by the World Bank, which seek to facilitate investment by a foreign investor, on the one hand, and another state -the host state -a process that is known as foreign direct investment (FDI). 62 seem an innocuous idea, its implications were far from it in the 1960s. Following the decolonization of Africa and parts of Asia, there was considerable emphasis on state sovereignty in international discourse. 63 As such, the idea of fettering this newly gained sovereignty by imposing global rules of conduct as to what a host state could and could not do in relation to those investors was unlikely to find many champions. 64 The solution proposed by the World Bank's General Counsel Aron Broches in 1963 was that the World Bank would not propose any substantive rules governing the treatment of foreign property or even require the adjudication of disputes arising out of such treatment in a particular forum. Rather, 'they would make available to foreign investors and host governments facilities for conciliation or arbitration of disputes between them' on a strictly voluntary basis. 65 Should the parties both agree to the arbitration, it would remove the dispute from the purview of the judiciary of the host state and that of the investor's state, and it would be resolved by an arbitral scheme that would provide for the enforceability of the awards. Thus, the system insulated the dispute from the realm of politics and diplomacy -a boon to both the investor, who would benefit from a stable safety net in case investments went awry, and the state, whose sovereignty would not be eroded by a foreign court but, rather, by a specific ad hoc tribunal to which the state had consented. In short, and unlike the WTO, ICSID simply provides a forum, and not the rules, for dispute resolution.
The substantive rules for arbitration come from Article 42 of the ICSID Convention.
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That is, Article 42(1) provides a conduit to the rules that are applicable:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.
In practice, there will be rules governing a given investment in the form of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between the state of the investor and the host state. As a result, the law that is applied by the tribunal is as varied as there are BITs, which sources estimate as numbering over 3,000. 67 However, the principles contained in them generally tend to include freedom from discrimination, protection against expropriation and fair and equitable treatment.
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Thus, unlike the WTO, the ICSID Convention provides an institutional structure for individuals to bring claims against states in the field of investment. Thus, our Douglas MacDonald can bring his case directly against Norway. That said, ICSID resembles the two-tiered system of the WTO. There is an appeal mechanism, with a tribunal whose awards can be reviewed by an ad hoc committee. For the tribunal, unlike the WTO, the parties are free to choose the arbitrators. 69 They may choose from the Panel of Arbitrators, which is a body of arbitrators put forward by the state members of the ICSID Convention, but they do not have to. In any case, the arbitrator must meet the requirements in Article 14 of a 'high moral character', 'recognised competence' in a relevant field and those who 'may be relied on to exercise independent judgment'.
After the tribunal makes an award in respect of the dispute, which, unlike the WTO, may contain named dissents and concurring opinions, 70 recourse is available to an ad hoc committee of three persons chosen by the chairman of ICSID from a roster of arbitrators. 71 These arbitrators may not, inter alia, share nationality with the parties or any of the members of the tribunal. The sole function of the committee is to annul the award, in part or in full, or to let it stand; it may not enter a merits review. Indeed, if the decision is annulled, it will have to be submitted afresh to a tribunal to recommence the arbitration. 72 Unlike the WTO, where the seven Appellate Body members are distinct from the panel arbitrators, in ICSID, there is one common roster of arbitrators for both the tribunal and the ad hoc committee.
There is no requirement for the parties to be consulted in the composition of the ad hoc committee, although, in practice, it appears that the ICSID administration informs the parties of the proposed appointees and circulates their curricula vitae with a view to giving parties an opportunity to submit comments indicating that there might be a manifest lack of the qualities required for serving as a committee member. 73 The grounds of annulment set out in Article 52 are very limited, namely: (c) That there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) That there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) That the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based. 74 The narrow grounds of annulment focus on the 'procedural legitimacy' of a decision rather than on substantive correctness. 75 It is therefore immaterial whether that decision was substantively wrong. This reflects the underlying rationale of arbitration; as it is recorded in the drafting debates:
[a]fter considerable discussion [the International Law Commission] decided, having regard to the paramount requirement of finality, not to amplify -subject to one apparent exception [the failure to state the reasons for the award] -the grounds on which the annulment of the award may be sought.
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In other words, annulment is a 'limited and exceptional recourse' that protects against the egregious breaches of fundamental principles; it seeks to safeguard the finality of the award subject only to its procedural integrity and not to substantive legitimacy or accuracy.
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Unlike the WTO, which is predominantly forward-looking, an ICSID award, depending on the underlying BIT, can order the losing party to pay damages. The arbitrators can also impose 'provisional measures' in order to safeguard the rights of the parties, a measure that has some parallels to the English doctrine of interim relief. 78 The enforcement mechanism for ICSID lies in the 'distinctive feature' of Article 54, which provides that each contracting state to the ICSID Convention shall recognize the binding force of an award rendered pursuant to that Convention. 79 This means that the national courts of all 161 contracting states shall recognize such an award upon the provision of a copy signed by the Secretary General of ICSID and shall enforce it accordingly. Moreover, as Article 53 makes it clear, the award cannot be subject to appeal or remedy except in accordance with the Convention itself. The award is, in effect, res judicata and cannot be impugned or reopened in national courts. 80 Ibid., at 1140: 'The Convention's drafting history show that domestic authorities charged with recognition and enforcement have no discretion to review the award once its authenticity has been established. Not even the ordre public of the forum may furnish a ground for refusal.'
New Generation Agreements
A Is ICSID Still Fit for Its Purpose?
The solution proposed by Broches in 1963 of removing international dispute settlement from national courts and giving it to arbitrators has come into question in recent times. 81 Why so? Because, in addition to the concerns of consistency in case law, transparency and fairness, DRM via arbitration has been criticized as being inimical to 'basic principles of democratic and public accountability, regulatory capacity, budgetary flexibility, [and] judicial independence'. 82 Particularly controversial is the perceived loss of the 'right to regulate', which is vividly depicted in the following comment by one interest group:
After the Fukushima nuclear disaster the German government decided to phase-out nuclear energy. To protect public health, the governments of Uruguay and Australia introduced compulsory health warnings on cigarette packets. To redress the inequalities created by the apartheid regime, the South African government grants black people certain economic privileges. What do these scenarios have in common? They have all been legally challenged by companies that considered them harmful to their profits. However, they did not challenge the legislation in their respective host countries courts but sued the governments before an international tribunal of arbitrators in international investment disputes. In the past 20 years, many of these tribunals have granted big business dizzying sums in compensation -paid out of taxpayers' pockets often for democratically made laws to protect the environment, public health or social well-being. These concerns have taken root in the Commission's approach to future international investment treaties concluded by the EU. Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström has stated: 'My assessment of the traditional ISDS system has been clearit is not fit for purpose in the 21st century. I want the rule of law, not the rule of lawyers. I want to ensure fair treatment for EU investors abroad, but not at the expense of governments' right to regulate' and 'a state [should] never be forced to change legislation, only to pay fair compensation in cases where the investor is deemed to have been treated unfairly.'
85 Malmström has also criticized the fact that '[t]here is, for instance, no possibility to appeal errors of law or fact', 'that the system lacks legitimacy, accountability and transparency' and that the 'fragmented system' has 'no coherent multilateral rules on investment protection, nor any permanent structure to resolve investment disputes'. 86 In response to these concerns, the Commission has pushed for a new form of DRM in its recent trade agreements.
B CETA: A New Generation Agreement
For brevity, one may take CETA as a base for our examination. The DRM for investment is found in section F of Chapter 8. Under Article 8.19, a dispute should be settled amicably if it is possible to do so, and provision is made for a consultation period in which to work out any differences. Further, mediation may be resorted to at any time in the dispute resolution procedure. 88 If the dispute has not been resolved within 90 days of the submission of the request for consultations, the investor may submit a notice to bring his claim.
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A claim may be submitted under the ICSID Arbitration Rules, or other arbitral rules specified in Article 8.23(2), to the CETA tribunal on condition that the investor waives the right to bring the dispute before another international or national tribunal and desists from any existing claims. 90 The tribunal consists of 15 members, five EU 11, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF: 'The proposals outlined above are intended as the stepping stones towards the establishment of a multilateral system … the EU should pursue the creation of one permanent court. This court would apply to multiple agreements and between different trading partners, also on the basis of an opt-in system.' 88 CETA, supra note 2, Art. 8.20. 89 Ibid., Art. 8.21(1). 90 Ibid., Art. 8.22(1)(f), (g). nationals, five Canadians and five third country nationals who, like judges at the CJEU under Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to judicial office and, in addition, demonstrate expertise in public international law.
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They are appointed for a five-year term that is renewable once. The tribunal sits three strong, with one member for each of the sub-group of five, 92 although there is the possibility of a tribunal comprising only one member, which is a third country national, particularly where the investor is a small-or medium-sized enterprise. 93 The president is chosen by lot from the third country nationals, and the members shall be paid a monthly retainer fee to ensure their availability.
There is also an appellate tribunal with the power to review awards rendered by the tribunal. The grounds of review are to be found in Article 8.28(2), which allow for review on all of the bases of annulment in ICSID as well as for errors in the application or interpretation of applicable law and manifest errors in the appreciation of the facts, including the appreciation of domestic law. 94 The parties commit in Article 8.29 to the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal and an appellate mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes with trading partners, with a view to the hearing of disputes under this section by that body when established. There is an explicit code of ethics in Article 8.30, which refers to the International Bar Association's Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration and further provides that, upon appointment, a member shall refrain from acting as counsel or witness in any pending or new investment dispute. 95 Challenges to the appointments can be made to the International Court of Justice.
There are also provisions on how CETA is to be interpreted. It must be interpreted according to Article 31 of the VCLT, 'in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose', a point that is consistent with the rules applicable to WTO dispute resolution. Furthermore, it is expressly stated that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine the validity of a domestic measure and must follow the prevailing interpretation given to the domestic law by the courts or authorities of that party. 96 To reduce the risk of what might be perceived as judicial activism, Article 8.31(3) provides that where 91 Ibid., Art. 8.27(2). Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as adopted by the Treaty of Lisbon, OJ 2010 C 83/49. 92 CETA, supra note 2, Art. 8.27(6). 93 Ibid., Arts 8.23(5), 8.27(8). 94 CETA, ibid., also makes provision for administrative and organizational support for the appellate tribunal, with the details for the appointment of the members of the appellate tribunal and its functioning left to be fleshed out at a later date.
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International Bar Association, Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 23 October 2014, available at www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx. 96 CETA, supra note 2, Art. 8.31(2). There are also provisions that prevent double-dipping, the practice of bringing simultaneous claims arising out of the same set of facts in different arbitral or judicial fora (Art. 8.22(1)(f), (g)) and rules that establish the transparency of proceedings by providing open hearings and, in principle, the disclosure of documents (Art. 8.36(1), (5)) and prohibiting punitive damages (Art. 8.39(3), (4)).
'serious concerns' arise as in relation to an interpretation that may affect investment, the CETA Joint Committee may adopt interpretations of CETA and may specify that a given interpretation may have binding effect from a specific date. The exercise of this power does not appear to preclude the giving of an interpretation after the tribunal has made an award or the appellate tribunal has rendered a review, effectively giving a nonjudicial body the power to reverse a decision of the tribunal or committee or, during the review, giving the state parties the possibility to interfere with the process. 97 In terms of remedies, Article 8.34 allows for interim measures to protect the rights of the disputing party. Damages awarded by the tribunal must not be greater than the loss suffered by the investor, and, in any case, punitive damages are prohibited. 98 The enforcement of the award depends on the arbitration rules that the parties have selected for the arbitration. If they have selected the ICSID Arbitration Rules, then the tribunal's award is enforced as an ICSID award. 99 In any case, the award is binding between the disputing parties, and, subject to waiting periods to allow for revision, setting aside or annulment, the parties must swiftly comply with the awards.
It should be noted, however, that this is only the DRM for investment. There are other DRMs, for example, for Chapter 24, which deal with trade and environmental protection. 100 For this chapter, there is a process that involves, first, consultations with the relevant designated contact point and, second, if those do not give rise to a satisfactory solution, resort to a panel of experts with 'specialised knowledge or expertise in environmental law, issues addressed in ... Chapter [24] , or in the resolution of disputes arising under international agreements', who will then give a report setting out 'findings, determinations and recommendations'. 101 It is then up to the parties to strive to come up with a 'mutually satisfactory action plan'. 102 Of course, this is a much less robust DRM, no doubt considered to be more appropriate to the more sensitive issues of environmental regulation. By way of further contrast, Chapter 23 on trade and labour has a similar dispute resolution system, but the final article of this chapter simply states that '[t]he Parties understand that the obligations included under this Chapter are binding and enforceable'. This brief analysis of the DRM in CETA shows that, even within the scope of one agreement, there may be no 'one-size-fits-all' DRM. appellate mechanism known as the Investment Court System -as each EU international investment agreement will have its own appellate body as opposed to having recourse to a one-stop shop for all international investment disputes. 104 Therefore, there will be a Vietnam Appellate Body, a CETA one, a TTIP one and so on. In purely monetary terms, this is problematic; the members of those bodies must be paid a retainer in order to ensure that they are available at short notice. The Commission itself has recognized the advantage of one Appellate Body 'applying to multiple agreements with multiple partners', but it has also recognized the level of international consensus that this will require. 105 Nonetheless, as one commentator has noted, given that the EU states are party to over half of the world's BITs, if the EU is serious about a multilateral Investment Court System, then the EU would be a good place to start.
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Responses to the Commission's proposals have been mixed for diametrically opposing reasons. Some see it as losing all of the advantages of ISDS by 'judicializing' DRMs whose purported virtue lie precisely in the fact that they are not state judicial bodies, 107 whereas others simply see the Investment Court System as arbitration in different clothes under a new acronym. 108 Issues of policy aside, questions have been asked as to whether this form of DRM is compatible with the EU legal order on the basis that it could involve EU legislation being called into question outside the EU legal system. The Walloon administration in Belgium thinks it is not compatible, and, as part of an agreement to ratify CETA, it has prevailed upon the Belgian federal government to 104 105 Investment in TTIP and Beyond, supra note 87: 'The EU should work towards the establishment of an international investment court and appellate mechanism with tenured judges with the vocation to replace the bilateral mechanism which would be established [in the TTIP]. This would be a more operational solution in the sense of applying to multiple agreements with multiple partners but it will require a level of international consensus that will need to be built. It is suggested to pursue this in parallel with establishing bilateral appeal mechanisms. These changes are intended to be the stepping stones towards a permanent multilateral system for investment dispute'; Titi, supra 
Concluding Remarks
As I have shown, the possibility that DRMs in EU international trade agreements might replicate, at least to some extent, the EU direct effect model for individual-driven enforcement has now been superseded in non-investment agreements by a system that is much more closely aligned to the WTO system. In other words, the dispute is to be resolved by the contracting parties alone at the international level. The WTO system is undoubtedly a less effective DRM than the system of direct effect within the EU, but this is a deliberate policy choice to preclude, as Ehlermann puts it, a shift of power from the executive and legislature to the courts. By contrast, the DRM in ICSID is, in many respects, more powerful than in the WTO, notably in that it can be invoked directly by individuals and that awards are enforceable through national courts, but it is in part these features that have led to its legitimacy being now called into question in some circles. All of this provides much to mull over with respect to the content of DRMs in future international trade and investment agreements. One thing that is clear, however, is that DRMs of an arbitral or judicial nature are here to stay.
